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Recent Developments
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

- DOES AN ALIEN'S STATE NARCOTICS CONVICTION SUBJECT HIM TO MANDATORY DEPORTATION UNDER SECTION
241(a)(11) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT IF HIS CONVICTION HAS BEEN SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO A STATE PROCEDURE?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act' (Act)
provides in mandatory terms that any alien who has been convicted of
illegal possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marijuana shall be
deported upon order of the Attorney General.' Since the Act does not define
the term "convicted," the federal courts have been confronted with the issue
of whether state expungement of an alien's state conviction eliminates the
"conviction" for the purposes of section 241(a)(11). 3 Two recent conflicting
decisions have highlighted the complexity of the question.
In Kolios v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,4 the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that an alien convicted in a Texas
state court of trafficking in marijuana remained subject to mandatory deportation under section 241(a)(11)5 notwithstanding the fact that his conviction had
been set aside by the state upon fulfillment of conditions of probation. 6 The

1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-

1557 (1970).
2. Section 241(a)(11) provides in pertinent part:

Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the

order of the Attorney General, be deported who is, or hereafter at any time after
entry has been, a narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of
a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating to the
illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana ....
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
3. For recent discussions of the relationship between state expungement statutes
and section 241(a)(11), see Aberson, Deportationof Aliens for Criminal Convictions,2
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 52 (1974); Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration
Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1975); Sevilla, In Defense of the Alien, 1 NAT'L J.
CRIM. DEF. 255 (1975); Comment, Lawful "Impermanent" Residence: Deportation
Without Warning for Minor Drug Offenses, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1299 (1975).
4. 532 F.2d 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 884 (1976).
5. For the text of §241(a)(11) of the Act, see note 2 supra.
6. 532 F.2d at 787-90. At present, 33 states have taken steps to lessen or remove
the criminal sanctions commonly applied to marijuana related activity. Within the
past three years, Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Ohio, and Oregon have enacted
statutes decriminalizing the possession or use of small quantities of marijuana.
Generally, the remaining sanction against marijuana use is a civil fine, with no
threat of a criminal arrest or a conviction record. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.110(d)-(e)
(1976); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-22-412 (Cum. Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (Supp. 1975); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.11(c)(3) (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.207(3) (1975).
In addition, 27 other states have acted to lessen the impact of criminal
sanctions for marijuana usage. Certain state statutes provide that the trial court may

(149)
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principles enunciated in Kolios, which are supported by similar cases from
other circuits,7 were subsequently challenged in Rehman v. Immigration &
grant a probationary term without entering a formal conviction to a first offender.
Upon successful completion of the probationary period, the court may dismiss the
charges, thereby expunging all traces of a conviction. Similarly, some states permit
an offender who has complied in all respects with the terms of the probation to
petition the court for the expungement of his conviction. Then, the trial judge is vested
with discretionary authority to grant or deny the petition. These statutes, which apply
exclusively to first offenders, may be classified as follows:
1. Sixteen states permit the dismissal of all charges and expungement of a
conviction of drug possession for first offenders who successfully complete their
probationary term. These states and their applicable statutes are: Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 79A-9917 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 37-2738 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56
/2, § 1410 (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 204.409(1) (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 218A.990(6)(k), (7)(h) (Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:983 (Supp. 1977);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 335.347(1) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.336(6) (1973); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-30 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-117 (Supp. 1976);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§39-17-113 to 114 (Supp. 1976); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4476-15, §4.12 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-8(10) (1974); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-251 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.47(1) (West 1974); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-347.37 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
2. Eight states provide for a probationary term and the subsequent
expungement of both the conviction and arrest record upon successful completion of
probation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.14 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 292(a)-(b) (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.18(1)-(2) (Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 2-410 (West 1971); W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-407 (Supp. 1976).
However, the expungement procedure in some states is conditioned upon the
offender being under a specified age at the time of arrest. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-29-150(e)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:21-27(a)(2), -28 (Supp. 1976);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-11-28 (Supp. 1975).
3. Three states limit the accessibility of the probationary procedure and
subsequent expungement of arrest records to first offenders convicted of possession of
marijuana and other nonnarcotic drugs. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 34
(Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-96(a)-(b) (Supp. 1975) (under 21 years of age at
time of conviction for expungement); S.C. CODE § 32-1510.57(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975)
(under 25 years of age at time of conviction for expungement).
7. See, e.g., Padilla-Partida v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 619
(9th Cir. 1972) (Ninth Circuit expressly refused to abandon hard line taken in cases
cited infra); Gonzalez de Lara v. United States, 439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971) (an alien,
convicted in state court of marijuana possession, was subject to deportation although
the alien had been granted probation by the state court, releasing him from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense upon satisfactory completion of
the probationary period); Cruz-Martinez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 404
F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955 (1969) (finding that petitioner was
deportable as a result of a state narcotics conviction would not be influenced by a
state court order setting aside the conviction and releasing petitioner from all
penalties and disabilities resulting under state law from the conviction); Brownrigg v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 356 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1966) (state expungement
proceedings do not expunge the state narcotics conviction for purposes of section
241(a)(11)); Kelly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 932 (1965) (setting aside of alien's narcotics conviction pursuant to a
state procedure authorizing such expungement on fulfillment of conditions of
probation does not affect the fact of alien's state conviction within meaning of
§241(a)(11)); Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 344 F.2d 804
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965) (setting aside of alien's plea of guilty
pursuant to a California statute upon fulfillment of conditions of probation did not
expunge the conviction for possession of heroin within the meaning of § 241(a)(11));
Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1959) (state conviction of alien, followed by a
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NaturalizationService,8 wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a state conviction for possession of marijuana does
not constitute a "conviction" within the meaning of section 241(a)(11) 9 when it
is accompanied by a certificate of relief from disabilities. 10
This note will examine the relative merit of the reasoning articulated in
both opinions, and will attempt to determine whether or not recognition of
state expungement statutes would frustrate the congressional intent
underlying section 241(a)(11). The outcome of the Rehman-Kolios controversy will have a significant impact on the field of immigration law, since a
resolution in favor of Rehman would eliminate the necessity for mandatory
deportation in similar factual situations.1"
II.

THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN

Kolios

In 1972, petitioner, age twenty, a citizen of Greece who had immigrated
to the United States in 1968, pleaded guilty to selling marijuana and was
suspended sentence and placement on probation, remains a "conviction" within
meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(4), which renders deportable
any alien convicted of crime involving moral turpitude). See also Aguilera-Enriquez v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050 (1976) (alien's conviction pursuant to a plea of guilty was final, rendering
him deportable, even though alien had filed motion to withdraw guilty plea which
was likely to succeed).
8. 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976).
9. See note 2 supra.
10. Section 701 of the New York Correction Code provides for the discretionary
granting of such certificates in the following language:
1. A certificate of relief from disabilities may be granted as provided in this
article to relieve an eligible offender of any forfeiture or disability, or to remove
any bar to his employment, automatically imposed by law by reason of his
conviction of the crime or of the offense specified therein. Such certificate may be
limited to one or more enumerated forfeitures, disabilities or bars, or may relieve
the eligible offender of all forfeitures, disabilities and bars. Provided, however,
that no such certificate shall apply, or be construed so as to apply, to the right of
such person to retain or to be eligible for public office.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a conviction of a crime or of
an offense specified in a certificate of relief from disabilities shall not cause
automatic forfeiture of any license, permit, employment or franchise, including
the right to register for or vote at an election, or automatic forfeiture of any other
right or privilege, held by the eligible offender and covered by the certificate. Nor
shall such conviction be deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of any
provision of law that imposes, by reason of a conviction, a bar to any
employment, a disability to exercise any right or a disability to apply for or to
receive any license, permit or other authority or privilege, covered by the
certificate.
3. A certificate of relief from disabilities shall not, however, in any way
prevent any judicial, administrative, licensing or other body board or authority
from relying upon the conviction specified therein as the basis for the exercise of
its discretionary power to suspend, revoke, refuse to issue or refuse to renew any
license, permit, or other authority or privilege.
N.Y. CORREC. LAw § 701 (Supp. 1976).
11. See notes 49-59 and accompanying text infra. Prior federal court interpretations of the requirements for a "conviction" under § 241(a)(11) have uniformly been at
variance with this aspect of the Rehman decision. See notes 48-59 and accompanying
text infra; see also Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 709 (1976).
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placed on probation by a Texas state court.1 2 Because of his state conviction,
13
he was subsequently found deportable under section 241(a).(11) of the Act.
Petitioner was not deported at once, however, and in 1975, when his
conditions of probation had been satisfied and his conviction in the Texas
court set aside, 14 he argued before the Board of Immigration Appeals that
the deportation order should be reversed because his conviction within the
meaning of the Act had been effectively erased.' 5 When the Board rejected
this contention, petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. The First Circuit, apparently with considerable
misgivings,' 6 opted to adhere to what it conceived to be congressional
policy,' 7 and affirmed the Board's decision. Although recognizing the
theoretical inconsistencies and harsh personal realities inherent in such a
determination,'" the court nonetheless concluded that Congress could not
have intended state expungement statutes to shield alien drug offenders
from the federal sanction of mandatory deportation. 19
12. Kolios v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 786, 787 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 884 (1976).
13. 532 F.2d at 787. For the text of § 241(a)(11) of the Act, see note 2 supra.
14. 532 F.2d at 787.
15. Id.
16. See note 17 infra.
17. 532 F.2d at 789. The court voiced its reluctance to compel the deportation of
petitioner in such a "sympathetic case," stating that "[h]is crime appears to have
been near the minimum in the drug spectrum." Id. at 788. Nonetheless, the court
concluded, "not without some hesitancy," that
relief in such cases as this is properly a matter for the Congress. We add our own
view that some flexibility would appear to be desirable; automatic deportation of
all drug offenders, despite conviction for a minor offense, satisfactory completion
of a probationary term, and erasure of the conviction by the concerned state,
would seem to serve no national interest.
Id. at 790.
18. The First Circuit in Kolios recognized the persuasive force of petitioner's
contentions, in which
[h]e questions why he should be deported when someone convicted of a crime of
moral turpitude could avoid deportation by obtaining the same order of
expungement. He also notes that had he been convicted for a narcotics offense
under Federal law and dealt with under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, he
would not be deported following expungement ....

Further, the Service now

accords recognition to state expungements of marijuana offenders treated and
In light of the currently ambivalent
expunged under state juvenile statutes ....
community and Congressional attitudes toward minor marijuana offenses ... ,
the policy of construing deportation laws strictly against deportability..., and
the legitimate goal of stimulating rehabilitation behind any expungement
statute, he contends that the time has come to ameliorate the harshness of the
rule initiated by the 1959 opinion of the Attorney General.
532 F.2d at 788-89 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 788-89. The position adopted in Kolios, that established federal policies
would be contravened by the infusion of state procedures into an analysis of a
§241(a)(11) "conviction," was articulated in Cruz-Martinez v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 404 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955 (1969). In
Cruz-Martinez, the Ninth Circuit insisted that,
[d]eportation is a function of federal and not of state law. In the context of a
narcotics conviction, deportation is a punishment independent from any that
may or may not be imposed by the states. While it is true that the same event, the
state conviction, triggers both sets of consequences, it would be anamalous for a
federal action based on a state conviction to be controlled by how the state
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The court commenced its analysis by examining the 1956 amendment to
the Act,2° which expressly prohibited alien drug offenders from obtaining
relief from deportation through executive pardon or judicial recommendation, while leaving those avenues available for aliens convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. 21 Although relying on this statute as a statement
of congressional intent, the court readily conceded that a strict implementa22
tion of the policy favoring wholesale deportation of narcotics offenders
would inevitably conflict with an equally pressing national concern: the
rehabilitation of youthful offenders. 23 Congressional intent in this latter
area, the First Circuit noted, was evidenced by enactment of the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 24 under which a young alien drug offender convicted
chooses to subsequently treat the event. It is the fact of state conviction, not the
manner of state punishment for that conviction, that is crucial.
404 F.2d at 1200.
20. The Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 728, § 301, 70 Stat. 575 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970)).
21. Id. The amendment, inter alia, incorporated the final sentence into the current
§ 1251(b) which now provides:
The provisions . . . of this section respecting the deportation of an alien
convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply (1) in the case of any alien who has
subsequent to such conviction been granted a full and unconditional pardon by
the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several states,
or (2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of
first imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a
recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due
notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall
be granted an opportunity to make representations in the matter. The provisions
of this subsection shall not apply in the case of any alien who is charged with
being deportable from the United States under subsection (a)(11) of this section.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
22. 532 F.2d at 787. Chief Judge Coffin, writing for the majority, stressed that the
federal courts had long and faithfully adhered to the pronouncements of the Attorney
General, and that the increasingly stringent measures imposed upon alien narcotics
offenders by the 1956 amendment were indicative of a crystallized national policy to
insulate the federal substantive requirements for deportation from intrusions by state
expungement statues. Id. at 788. The Attorney General's pronouncements on the
subject of state expungement procedures were enunciated in Matter of A --

F --

,8

I. & N. Dec. 429 (1959). The Attorney General there announced that a post-probation
expungement of a state narcotics conviction pursuant to a California statute was
ineffective to erase the "conviction" required for deportation under § 241(a)(11). 8 I. &
N. Dec. at 446. The Attorney General stated:
Congress did not intend that aliens convicted of narcotic violations should
escape deportation because, as in California, the State affords a procedure
authorizing a technical erasure of the conviction ....
I do not believe that the

term "convicted" may be regarded as flexible enough to permit an alien to take
advantage of a technical 'expungement' which is the product of a state procedure
wherein the merits of the conviction and its validity have no place. I believe that
Congress intended the inquiry to stop at the point at which it is ascertained that
there has been a conviction in the normal sense in which the term is used in
Federal law.
Id. at 445-46.
23. 532 F.2d at 789.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 5005-5026 (1970). Although, as previously noted (see note 2 supra),
§241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides for the automatic
deportation of an alien who has, at any time after entry, been convicted at either the
state or federal level of an offense involving narcotic drugs or marijuana, Congress
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on federal, rather than state, charges may avoid deportation. 25 Nevertheless,
the court reluctantly concluded that Congress, in passing the 1956
amendment declaring that alien drug offenders could obtain no reprieve
through executive or judicial clemency, 26 could not have intended that state
expungements accomplish what a solemn and deliberate act of the President
could not - the eradication of narcotics convictions for aliens.2 7 Moreover,
the majority doubted whether broad state expungement statutes, which
render expungement possible so long as the convicted alien is placed on
probation regardless of his age at the time of the offense, could be reconciled
with the stern congressional attitudes toward alien narcotics offenders. 28 In
had, in 1950, established a nondeportation disposition of narcotics offenses through
the enactment of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 81-865, 64 Stat. 1085
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5005-5026 (1970)). This Act provides for the expungement of a
youthful offender's federal narcotics conviction upon satisfactory completion of
probation. Id. However, in apparent contrast to the lenient spirit of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1956 to
specifically preclude aliens found deportable under §241(a)(11) from evading
deportation by way of an executive pardon or a judicial recommendation against
deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970), as amended by the Narcotics Control Act of
1956, Pub. L. No. 728, §301, 70 Stat. 575. See Aberson, supra note 3, at 67.
25. 532 F.2d at 789. The Federal Youth Corrections Act provides in pertinent part:
If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and the offense
is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than
this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise
provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney
General for treatment and supervision ....
18 U.S.C. §5010(b) (1970). This statute also provides for the ultimate expungement of
the youthful offender's conviction upon satisfactory completion of the probationary
term. "Upon the unconditional discharge by the division of a committed youth
offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed upon him, the
conviction shall be automatically set aside and the division shall issue to the youth
offender a certificate to that effect." Id. at § 5021(a).
After enactment of this legislation the issue that remained to be resolved by
the federal courts was whether an expungement of a federal conviction pursuant to
the Federal Youth Corrections Act eradicated the "conviction" for the purposes of
§241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This was answered in the
affirmative by the First Circuit in Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972). For a discussion of Mestre Morera, see notes 48 &
85-92 and accompanying text infra.
26. See note 21 supra.
27. 532 F.2d at 789-90.
28. Id. at 790. In an attempt to contrast the state statutes with the more
restrictive methods by which Congress has moved to lessen sanctions for narcotics
use, Chief Judge Coffin referred to the Controlled Substances Act which contemplates
the possibility of expungement exclusively for first offenders convicted merely of
possession of a controlled substance. 532 F.2d at 790. Section 844 of the Controlled
Substances Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to
possess a controlled
authorized ....

substance unless such substance was .

.

. otherwise

(b) (1) If any person who has not previously been convicted of violating
...any other law of the United States relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or
depressant or stimulant substances, is found guilty of a violation of subsection
(a) of this section after trial or upon a plea of guilty, the court may ... place him
on probation ....

If during the period of his probation such person does not

violate any of the conditions of the probation, then upon expiration of such
period the court shall discharge such person and dismiss the proceedings against
him ....

Such discharge or dismissal shall not be deemed a conviction for
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addition, the court noted that although Congress had manifested signs of
adopting an increasingly benign position toward punishment for minor
marijuana offenses,2 9 it had not displayed a willingness to extend such
treatment to drug offenses in toto.3'
Judge McEntee, in a dissenting opinion, conceded that "[t]his case is a
difficult one - in terms both of its human dimensions and of the problems
of statutory construction which it involves."'3' His dissent relied upon the
holding of the Supreme Court in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,32 which
announced that doubts as to the appropriate construction of the Act should
be resolved so as to "trench on [an alien's] freedom" only to the extent
required by the "narrowest of several possible meanings of the words
used. '33 Therefore, Judge McEntee emphasized the absence of an express
statutory prohibition against consideration of state expungement statutes
for the purpose of determining if there had been a "conviction" in the state
court for purposes of section 241(a)(11). 34 He contended, moreover, that the
reasoning in Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,3 5 in
which the First Circuit held that Congress would have established an
express prohibition if it had intended Federal Youth Corrections Act
36
expungements to have no effect upon deportation of alien offenders,
37
applied with equal force to the instant case.
Judge McEntee likewise rejected the majority's view that nonuniformity
38
of application of section 241(a)(11) would contravene congressional intent.
He asserted that Congress was aware of the different scope of state
expungement statutes as contrasted with federal provisions 39 and contended
that courts should be "reluctant to strain toward uniformity where Congress
has clearly countenanced variety through a system which partially relies on
state laws."' 40 Lastly, Judge McEntee concluded that it is incumbent upon
purposes of disqualificationsor disabilitiesimposed by law upon conviction of a
crime . . . or for any other purpose.
21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970) (emphasis added). It is submitted, however, that Chief Judge

Coffin's argument appears unpersuasive in the face of state expungement of an

alien's conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance - an offense of the
precise nature which Congress has deemed worthy of unconditional expungement.
Indeed, he conceded that "[a] closer question would be posed if a young offender's
state conviction for simple possession had been expunged. In such a case it could be
argued that he should be treated no more harshly than he would have been under 21
U.S.C. § 844." 532 F.2d at 790 n.ll.
29. 532 F.2d at 790 & n.10. See note 83 infra.
30. See note 83 infra.
31. 532 F.2d at 790 (McEntee, J., dissenting).
32. 333 U.S. 6 (1948).
33. Id. at 10.
34. 532 F.2d at 791 (McEntee, J., dissenting). For the text of § 241(a)(1 1) of the Act,
see note 2 supra.
35. 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 1032. For a further discussion of Mestre Morera, see notes 48 & 85-92

and accompanying text infra.

37. 532 F.2d at 791 (McEntee, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. For a comparison of pertinent state and federal provisions, see notes 2 & 6
supra.
40. For an examination of the manner in which the Federal deportation laws rely
upon state law, see notes 67 & 69 infra.
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Congress alone to limit the scope of mandatory deportation in these
instances.4'
III.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN Rehman

Petitioner, a twenty-two year old citizen of Pakistan temporarily
admitted to the United States on a student visa, was convicted of possession
of hashish in violation of New York law. 4 2 At trial, petitioner received a
sentence of a conditional discharge for one year and a fine of one hundred
dollars, while contemporaneously receiving a "certificate of relief from
disabilities" under the discretion of the trial judge.43 Subsequently, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings
against petitioner because of this conviction. 44 Petitioner argued before the
Board of Immigration Appeals that receipt of a "certificate of relief from
disabilities" removed his "conviction" for the purposes of section 241,
thereby eliminating the potentiality of mandatory deportation. 45 The Board,

however, rejected petitioner's contentions and found him deportable on the
strength of his state conviction.16 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside the order of deportation, explicitly
47
rejecting the reasoning of Kolios and a long line of prior authority.
Instead, the majority employed a less formalistic approach in ascertaining'
policy and determined that where federal law provides for eradication of
federal narcotics convictions under identical factual circumstances, it is
insupportable to deny state expungement statutes the same force and
48

effect.
41. The Second Circuit questioned the justification for the fixed state of the law in
this area in Oliver v. United States Dep't of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975). Although the question of the statutory requirements
for a "conviction" were never reached in the case, the court stated in dicta:
While particularly drastic deportation sanctions with respect to aliens found
guilty of participating in the importation of narcotics could readily be justified,
we must confess difficulty in seeing the rationality of the broad sweep of
§ 241(a)(11), applying to mere addiction and even to the possession of marijuana,
particularly as reinforced by the final sentence of § 241(b).
Id. at 428. For the text of § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970), see note 21 supra.
42. Rehman v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 544 F.2d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 1976).
Rehman was charged with the illegal possession of a controlled substance in the
seventh degree pursuant to § 220.23 of the New York Criminal Code. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 220.23 (Supp. 1975). 544 F.2d at 72. Seventh degree possession, or simple knowing
possession, is New York's lowest grade drug offense. Id.
43. 544 F.2d at 72; see note 10 supra.
44. 544 F.2d at 72; see note 2 supra.
45. 544 F.2d at 72. For the text of §241(a)(11) of the Act, see note 2 supra.
46. 544 F.2d at 72.
47. Id. at 75. For a listing of the authorities supporting the Kolios decision, see
note 7 supra.
48. 544 F.2d at 74-75. The majority's discussion focused upon two such analogous
federal procedures. Id. at 74. Section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 844 (1970), provides that a federal court has the discretionary power to place a first
offender on probation in lieu of a conviction for drug possession, thereby ruling out
deportation under §241(a)(11) for want of a "conviction." See note 28 supra. In
addition, youthful offenders may, pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18
U.S.C. §§5005-5025 (1970), have their convictions expunged upon satisfactory
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Judge Lumbard, writing for the majority, commenced his analysis by
acknowledging that since construction of a term in a federal immigration
statute is peculiarly a federal issue, an interpretation of the meaning of
"convicted" within section 241(a)(11) 49 necessitated a determination of
congressional intent.10 The majority conceded that persuasive evidence of
that intent appeared in the express dictate of section 241(b) 51 that an alien
convicted of a narcotics offense could not evade deportation by way of an
executive pardon or a judicial recommendation against deportability,
whereas an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude was under
no such restriction. 52 However, Judge Lumbard noted that this posture was
not so unyielding as to preclude exceptions to a strict deportation theory
grafted onto the federal law itself in the form of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act and the Controlled Substances Act. 53 As a result of this
apparent theoretical inconsistency, the Rehman majority speculated that
the petitioner would probably not presently be subject to deportation had he
been tried on federal, rather than state, charges. 54 Thus, Judge Lumbard
reasoned that a "less formalistic approach" was proper to ascertain whether
petitioner had received a "conviction" for deportation purposes in state
court.5 5 Using this approach, the majority concluded that "[ithere is no

sound reason why state policies should not be accorded the same respect as
' 56
federal leniency policies would receive under the same circumstances.
completion of probation. See note 25 supra. These expungement procedures, unlike
those emanating from state tribunals, have consistently been regarded as rendering
241(a)(11) inapplicable. See, e.g., Matter of Zingis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 621 (1974); Mestre
Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972); Matter of
Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (1974). The Ninth Circuit, however, formally rejected the
holding announced in Mestre Morera in Andrade-Gamiz v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 73-474 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'g Matter of Andrade-Gamiz, 14 I. & N. Dec.
364 (1973). There, the court held that Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d
639 (9th Cir. 1962), and not Mestre Morera was to be deemed the law of the Ninth
Circuit. See Aberson, supra note 3, at 76. The two cases, however, are clearly
distinguishable. Hernandez-Valensuela held merely that a conviction which could
potentially be set aside pursuant to § 5021(a) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18
U.S.C. § 5021(a) (1970), was nonetheless a "conviction" within the meaning of section
241(a)(11). 304 F.2d at 640. In Mestre Morera,however, the defendant's conviction had
been set aside pursuant to 5021(a) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act prior to the
appeal. 462 F.2d at 1031. See generally Comment, The Futile Forgiveness: Basing
Deportation on an Expunged Narcotics Conviction, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 372 (1966).
49. See note 2 supra.
50. 544 F.2d at 72-73.
51. Id. at 74. See note 21 supra.
52. 544 F.2d at 74. See Bronsztejn v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 526
F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1974), in which the court pointed out that "[a]lthough originally
directed primarily at narcotics 'traffickers', the legislative history of the INA leaves
no doubt that Congress intended a stringent deportation policy regarding drug
offenders." Id. at 1292. For the text of § 241(b), see note 21 supra.
53. 544 F.2d at 74. See note 48 supra.
54. See note 48 supra.
55. 544 F.2d at 74.
56. Id. at 74-75. Judge Lumbard, in interpreting the New York State expungement statute as one designed to prevent mandatory deportation, emphasized the
statutory language which states that a recipient of a certificate of relief from
disabilities shall not suffer "automatic forfeiture of any other right or privilege by
virtue of his conviction." Id. at 73 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, he
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Finally, the Rehman court urged that the underlying philosophy of the
Kolios decision - that it would contravene the intent of Congress if state
expungement statutes were permitted to exempt alien offenders from federal
penal enactments - was largely unrealistic. 57 In the face of federal
procedures5 8 that can accomplish precisely those objectives sought by the
state statutes deemed deleterious by the Kolios court, the majority
emphasized that it was self-evident that "states' freedom to remove persons
from the ambit of deportation law would extend no further than where
Congress itself has gone for federal criminals." 9
IV. A

RESOLUTION OF THE

Kolios-Rehman

CONTROVERSY

Although the decisions in Kolios and Rehman may appear to be
diametrically opposed, it is submitted that the First and Second Circuits
agree upon several salient issues. Both circuit courts accept the propositions
that interpretation of the federal immigration statutes requires an intensive
examination of congressional purpose, 60 that Congress itself has tempered
its policy of automatic deportation of alien drug offenders by enacting
legislation motivated by rehabilitative objectives, 61 and that provisions of
62
immigration statutes are to be construed strictly against deportation.
However, the courts disagree as to the effects that federal recognition of
state expungement statutes would have on the uniform application of
immigration law. The First Circuit determined that congressional intent
demanded that a "conviction" for the purposes of federal law be unaffected
by state expungement statutes.6 3 The Kolios view is supported by the

concluded that "[b]y freeing the offender from automatic forfeitures while leaving him
subject to discretionary ones, § 701 is designed to ensure that the conviction will not
trigger legal consequences from which there is no chance of an appeal ... " Id. at 73.
For text of § 701 of the New York Correction Code, see note 10 supra.
Judge Mulligan, in dissent, countered that "[t]here can be no question that
Rehman's state conviction still stands." 544 F.2d at 77 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). The
dissent relied upon DaGrossa v. Goodman, 72 Misc. 2d 806, 339 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct.
1972), in which the New York State Supreme Court interpreted section 701 to "in no
way eradicate or expunge the underlying conviction," thereby relieving the recipient
only from "disabilities imposed upon New York citizens by the action of specific New
York Statutes." Id. at 809, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (emphasis added).
57. 544 F.2d at 75.
58. See note 25, 28 & 48 supra.
59. 544 F.2d at 75.
60. See notes 17-19 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
61. See notes 24-25 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
62. Rehman v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 544 F.2d at 74 & n.6; Kolios
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d at 788-89. Numerous commentators

have argued that deportation constitutes an impermissible infringement of the

constitutional rights of lawfully admitted aliens. For discussions of this issue, see,
e.g., Bullitt, Deportationas a Denial of Substantive Due Process,28 WASH. L. REV. 205
(1953); Mancini, Deportation as Cruel and Unusual Punishment after Furman v.
Georgia, 3 U. SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 27 (1974); Comment, The Alien and the
Constitution,20 U. CHI. L. REV. 547 (1953); Note, Deportationas Punishment: Plenary
Power Re-Examined, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 466 (1975); Note, Immigration,Aliens, and
the Constitution, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1075 (1974).
63. 532 F.2d at 788-90.
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unequivocally expressed national policy of unconditional deportation of
alien drug offenders. 64 Consequently, despite the absence of statutory
directives on the issue of state expungements, 5 the Kolios court declined to
extend the Federal Youth Corrections Act's deportation barrier to similar
state statutes, ostensibly because this would undermine express congressional purpose.6 6 The Rehman court, on the other hand, concluded that
enforcement of state expungement statutes would not lead to haphazard
application of federal law; rather, the Second Circuit contended that federal
law would be applied more uniformly since "deportation will not be triggered
by minor differences and fortuitous technicalities in state laws. ' ' 67 In

addition, the Second Circuit stressed the inconsistency of recognizing
federal procedures which prevent federal convictions from activating
deportation procedures while refusing to accord the same treatment to state
procedures. 8
The key issue which remains to be resolved, therefore, is whether or not
state expungement statutes should be recognized in determining whether
there has been a state court "conviction" for purposes of section 241(a)(11). A
realistic evaluation of congressional intent in this area 69 must be considered
64. Id. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
65. Section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970), makes no mention
of state expungement procedures. See note 2 supra.
66. See note 24-25 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
67. 544 F.2d at 75. Although Judge Lumbard did not elaborate upon this
contention, it is presumed that the statement was made in reference to the fact that
state convictions pivot upon the existence of state penal codes which regard drug
related activity as criminal offenses. Moreover, the Board of Immigration Appeals, in
Matter of Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (1974), has announced that state expungements
pursuant to state statutes modeled after the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 5005-5026 (1970), would be given effect in eradicating the effect of the "conviction"
for purposes of deportation. Id. at 652. See notes 95-98 and accompanying text infra.
Hence, it is submitted that uniformity of enforcement is patently unattainable, in
spite of the federal court's attempts to shield the immigration laws from the effects of
state law idiosyncracies. See note 69 infra.
68. 544 F.2d at 74-75. See notes 48, 56 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
69. An examination of the legislative history of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956,
Pub. L. No. 728, § 301, 70 Stat. 575 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970), reveals no
express congressional intent to insulate deportation from the potential effects of state
expungement procedures; indeed, no mention is made in the Senate report of state

expungement statutes or of a fixed congressional policy to require only convictions
"in fact" for the purposes of section 241(a)(11). See S. REP. No. 1997, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1956). Therefore, it would appear that the only substantive support for the
contention in Kolios that deportation under the statute was designed to function
independently from state procedural "technicalities" is to be derived from the theory
that Congress, in rendering ineffectual executive pardons and judicial recommendations against deportation, must also have intended that no state expungement
procedure be permitted to contravene the automatic effects of § 241(a)(11). Notwithstanding congressional intent, however, the peculiarities of state law may effect the
operation of § 241(a)(11). For example, in states where marijuana-related activity has
been decriminalized, a conviction would not be attainable. In contrast, in other states
where criminal sanctions do append to such activity, a conviction may result which
could lead to subsequent deportation. See note 6 supra.
In Matter of G -- , 9 I. & N. Dec. 159 (1960), the Attorney General stated that
the question of whether an alien is deemed "convicted" of an activity involving moral
turpitude, and thereby deportable under § 241(a)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)
(1970), is not "purely a 'federal question' to be determined in terms of the policy
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in conjunction with evolving societal attitudes toward deportation and drug
use.70 It is urged that the Rehman holding that state judicial relief from
disabilities is effective to insulate a narcotics offender from the sanction of
deportation under section 241(a)(11) 71 does no violence to the spirit of the
federal immigration laws, while demonstrating a heightened sensitivity to
the plight of the alien and the practical realities of deportation.72
The rationale espoused in the Kolios line of cases, 73 concerning the
impotence of state expungement statutes to prevent federally sanctioned
deportation, appears to be derived from the 1959 opinion of the Attorney
General of the United States in Matter of A --

F

--.

74 In that case, the

Attorney General admonished that the "clear national policy" of deportation of narcotics offenders precludes an alien narcotics violator from
evading deportation simply because "the State affords a procedure
authorizing a technical erasure of the conviction. ' 75 Therefore, the Attorney
General held on review that state expungements following a probationary
term will have no bearing upon the validity of a deportation order under
section 241(a)(11), since "Congress intended the inquiry to stop at the point
at which it is ascertained that there has been a conviction in the normal
sense in which the term is used in Federal Law. '76 The First Circuit's
reliance upon this statutory analysis is, however, subject to criticism on

behind its enactment and without regard to state law and procedure" and that a state
expungement of an alien's conviction "withdraws the support of that conviction from
a deportation order ...and brings it to the ground." Id. at 169. Thus, the application
of federal law in the realm of deportation of aliens would appear to require an inquiry
into the existence of state procedures, despite the fact that such procedures may
operate to remove aliens from the sphere of federal sanctions.
Therefore, it is submitted that, although the legislative histories of the
amendments of 1956 and 1960 unequivocally pronounce a congressional policy of
severity towards alien drug offenders, this alone is insufficient to establish a
congressional intent to disregard state expungement procedures in determining
whether a conviction has been obtained at the state level. See S. REP. No. 1651, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 574, 576. S.REP. No.
1997, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1956] U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 651, 661.
70. For contemporary discussions of marijuana use and its legal and sociophysiological implications, see, e.g., Brecher, Marijuana: The Health Questions! The
Legal Questions, 4 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 115 (1975); Goode, Sociological Aspects of
Marijuana Use, 4 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 377 (1975); Soler, Of Cannabis and the
Courts: A Critical Examination of ConstitutionalChallenges to Statutory Marijuana
Prohibitions,6 CONN. L. REV. 601 (1974).
71. See note 2 supra.
72. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), recognized
that deportation "may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes
life worth living." Id. at 284. Similarly, Mr. Justice Douglas observed in Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, that "[t]hough deportation is not technically a criminal
proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right
to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty - at
times a most serious one - cannot be doubted." Id. at 154. For further discussion of
the characteristics of punishment inherent in deportation, see Note, Resident Aliens
and Due Process: Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 VILL. L. REV. 566, 576-85 (1963).
73. See note 7 supra, 12-41 and accompanying text supra.
74. 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (1959).
75. Id. at 445. See note 22 supra.
76. 8 I. & N. Dec. at 445.
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several grounds. Although the amendment of 195617 specifically precluded
aliens subject to deportation under Section 241(a)(11)7 8 from employing
executive pardon or judicial recommendation against deportation as a
shield, 79 section 241(a)(11) contained no reference to marijuana prior to 1960,
and applied exclusively to crimes involving narcotics.80 The Attorney
General's oft quoted statement of congressional intent on the subject of state
expungement procedures was thus made solely in reference to state narcotics
convictions, and did not consider state convictions for sale or possession of
marijuana. Consequently, although the Attorney General's pronouncements
may have accurately reflected the prevailing congressional sentiment in
1959 toward narcotics violations by aliens, a presumption that the severe
congressional posture toward crimes involving narcotics necessarily
attaches by extension to marijuana related offenses would seem unfounded.
Alternatively, the subsequent inclusion of marijuana offenses within the
ambit of section 241(a)(11)81 does not, in and of itself, indicate that Congress
82
intended to eliminate the effects of state expungement statutes.
Recent legislation has effected a lessening of criminal sanctions for the
possession and personal use of marijuana, in keeping with modified societal
attitudes toward marijuana.8 3 These developments, in conjunction with an
77. See note 21 supra.
78. See note 2 supra.
79. See note 21 supra.
80. In 1960, Congress amended § 241(a)(11) to specifically include offenses
involving marijuana, a nonnarcotic drug, in determining deportability of aliens. Act
of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 505 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11)
(1970)).
81. See note 80 supra.
82. Indeed, then Solicitor General Bork remarked that "[w]hile the inclusion of
marihuana offenses in Section 1251(a)(11) in 1960 did reflect a judgment that such
offenses could be a basis for deportation, the legislative history of that amendment
does not suggest a specific congressional intent that expungement of a marihuana
conviction (or indeed of any conviction covered by Section 1251(a)(11)) should be
completely disregarded for deportation purposes." Letter from Robert H. Bork,
Solicitor General, to Charles Gordon, Esq., General Counsel for the Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., reprinted in Matter of Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651, 659 n.6 app.
(1974).
83. See note 70 supra. In addition to those congressional activities designed to
exclude select marijuana offenses as bases for deportation that were enunciated in
Kolios, 532 F.2d at 790 n.10, there have been other equally persuasive manifestations
of congressional concern over the effects of marijuana use in the United States.
Preceding the establishment of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug
Abuse (Commission), it was noted that, "[t]he Congress finds that the use of

marihuana is increasing in the United States, especially among the young people
thereof, and that there is a need for a better understanding of the health consequences
of using marihuana. The Congress further finds that . . . there is a lack of an
authoritative source for obtaining information involving the health consequences of
using marihuana." Act of June 30, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-296, § 501, 84 Stat. 352. Hence,
Congress provided for the establishment of the Commission to study, inter alia, "the
pharmacology of marihuana and its immediate and long-term effects, both
physiological and psychological" and "the relationship of marihuana use to
aggressive behavior and crime." Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 601, 84
Stat. 1236. Additionally, the enactment of § 404 of the Controlled Substances Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970)) provided for the
availability of expungement for first convictions on charges of simple possession of
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application of the well-established judicial principle that deportation
statutes are to be construed in favor of the alien,8 4 would appear to rebut the
Kolios court's contention that congressional dictates leave the courts
powerless to revise past interpretations of congressional objectives. Earlier,
in Mestre Morera v. United States Immigration & NaturalizationService,85
the First Circuit ruled that an expungement of a marijuana conviction
pursuant to successful completion of a probationary term under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act 86 constituted an erasure of the "conviction"
mandating deportation under section 241(a)(11).17 In reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit considered the language of section 241(b) 88 to be an
unsubstantial obstacle to a determination that a certificate of relief
effectively thwarts deportation under the Act.89 The Mestre Morera court
emphasized that such federally endorsed "technical erasures" expressed a
"Congressional concern, which we cannot say to be any less strong than its
concern with narcotics, that juvenile offenders be afforded an opportunity to
atone for their youthful indiscretions." 90 However, in Kolios, the First
Circuit attempted to distinguish the policy objectives behind the Federal
Youth Corrections Act from those of state expungement statutes generally,9 '
and stated that their decision in Mestre Morera stemmed from "the
Congressional policy of rehabilitation for young offenders. ' 92 It is submitted, however, that this reasoning is contrary to the court's statement in
Mestre Morera that "[tihe clear purpose for the automatic setting aside of a
youthful offender's conviction. . under the Federal Youth Correction Act is
to relieve him not only of the usual disabilities of a criminal conviction, but
also to give him a second chance free of a record tainted by such a
conviction." 93 Based on this reasoning, there appears to be no valid basis for
distinguishing expungements under the Federal Youth Corrections Act from
those under state statutes on the basis of underlying policy, since both seek
to insulate the first offender from deportation and provide an opportunity
94
for the young alien to right himself.
controlled substances, rendering the prior conviction a nullity for any and all
purposes. See note 28 supra. Finally, the Commission's 1972 report contained the
recommendation that both possession of marijuana for personal use and "casual
distribution of small amounts of marijuana for no remuneration, or insignificant
remuneration not involving profit" be decriminalized. FIRST REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG AsUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING, at 152 (1972). For a pertinent discussion on the topic of

marijuana and deportation, see Gordon, supra note 3, at 20-21.
84. See Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642 (1954); Lennon v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975).
85. 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972). See note 25 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 25 supra.
87. 462 F.2d at 1032.
88. See note 21 supra.
89. 462 F.2d at 1032.
90. Id.
91. 532 F.2d at 789-90.
92. Id. at 789.
93. 462 F.2d at 1032.
94. For a discussion of Mestre Morera and subsequent cases of significance, see
Aberson, supra note 3, at 68-81.
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There remains, then, only the assertion of the Kolios line of authority
that reliance upon state expungement procedures would cause deportation to
be wholly dependent upon the individual characteristics of state law, and
would thereby defeat the purposes of federal law. 95 This contention was
implicitly rejected, however, in Matter of Andrade,96 which held that a state
marijuana conviction of a youth offender expunged pursuant to a state
statute analogous to the Federal Youth Corrections Act will not constitute a
deportable "conviction" so long as the youthful alien would have qualified
for federal expungement of his conviction. 97 This decision, sparked by a
recommendation of the Solicitor General of the United States, 98 extended the
Mestre Morera doctrine to the domain of the states pursuant to the Solicitor
General's conclusion that "there is little, if any, reason to justify a different
result where the expungement of a youth offender's conviction occurred
pursuant to state law." 99 In light of the Andrade ruling, it is therefore
submitted that the contention in Kolios that state procedures may not
intrude upon the sphere of federal penal enforcement is clearly illusory. 1'0
This conclusion is supported by Andrade since certain state expungement
procedures are given effect in spite of the fact that uniformity of application
will be frustrated. 10
V.

CONCLUSION

Andrade thus precludes an argument against the efficacy of state
expungement statutes that is predicated upon a "federal autonomy"
analysis.9 2 Moreover, no compelling distinctions can be drawn between
state expungement statutes which adopt the form of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act and those that provide for an extended probationary term
before expungement will be made available. The failure of the federal courts
to recognize the need for reformation of judicial thought in this area may be
attributable to a reluctance to depart from a statutory analysis solidified
over time by application of stare decisis. This passive maintenance of the
status quo is particularly unfortunate when it results in such extreme
consequences - deportation for minor drug related offenses that society no
longer considers repugnant.
It is accordingly submitted that Rehman, along with Mestre Morera and
Andrade, reflects a welcome and timely change in judicial interpretation of
federal immigration laws. It is hoped that in the future, other courts will
follow the progressive lead established in these cases.
Robert E. Greshes
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See notes 19 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (1974).
Id. For an in-depth discussion of Andrade, see Aberson, supra note 3, at 76-81.
See note 82 supra.
14 I. & N. Dec. at 657.
See note 69 supra.
See note 67 and text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
See notes 67 & 69 and text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
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